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INTRODUCTION

On May 8, 2009, the Florida Legislature approved Senate Bill 788.1
The bill would grant the Seminole Indian Tribe of Florida (Seminole Tribe)
the right to operate casino style gambling, in exchange for $2.2 billion paid
to the State of Florida over fifteen years.2 Faced with a rapidly approaching
deadline, the success of Senate Bill 788 remained unclear as of August 1,
2009, due to the various requirements the bill must satisfy.3 First, Florida
Governor, Charles Crist, has to negotiate the compact with the tribe.4 If negotiations are successful, the deal would still have to be approved by the
Florida Legislature and the federal government.5 Similar to the events that
took place during the failed compact of 2007,6 "[fiederal officials have
threatened to step in and set rules for the tribe if the state fails to act. In that
case, the state would get nothing from the tribe."7
The difficulty in having Senate Bill 788 enacted represents how complex negotiating a gaming compact can be.8 In 1979, the first bingo parlor
operating on a reservation was opened by the Seminole Tribe. 9 The Seminole Tribe first sought to negotiate a compact permitting Class Ell gaming
beginning in 1991.10 Seventeen years after the first compact negotiation and
after four different governors entered office in Florida, a compact allowing
Class El gaming still has not been solidified. 1
Reminiscent of the 2007 failed compact, it appears that the requirements that must be met to finalize Senate Bill 788 will once again result in a
substantial amount of litigation. 12 According to the Seminole Tribe's attorney, the compact as currently written lacks the granting of exclusive gaming

1. Mary Ellen Klas, New Deal on Gambling OK'd, MIAMI HERALD, May 9, 2009, at B1.
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Data Kam, Gaming Deal Needs Revise, Lawyer Says, PALM BEACH POST, June 13,
2009, at BI [hereinafter Kam, Gaming Deal].
5. Id.
6. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 605 (Ha.2008). The Department "urged Governor Crist to negotiate a compact, warning that if a compact was not
signed by November 15, 2007, the Department would finally issue procedures." Id.
7. Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
8. See Ron M. Rosenberg, When Sovereigns Negotiate in the Shadow of the Law: The
1998 Arizona-PimaMaricopa Gaming Compact, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 283, 289 (1999).
9. Id. at 287.
10. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 605.
11. See id.
12. See Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
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rights to the Seminole Tribe as required by federal law.13 Considering the
complicated process which must be followed before a compact can be
reached, 14 this article will evaluate whether Senate Bill 788 satisfies the
compact requirements imposed by Florida and federal law.
Part I of this article will discuss the law that applies to the type of gaming contained in Senate Bill 788. Part III is an analysis of the compact
process and the important issues which are raised when a tribe wants to conduct gaming that requires state approval. Part IV evaluates the failed 2007
compact, and applies the compact process to Senate Bill 788. Finally, part V
determines whether Senate Bill 788 satisfies the complex compact requirements.
II.

INDIAN GAMING GENERALLY

Indian gaming produces over twenty-six billion dollars in revenues a
year. 15 Over 200 tribes operate the 400 Indian gaming establishments that
exist in the United States. 6 Considering the substantial potential for revenue, it is not surprising that the process a tribe must go through in order to
receive gaming rights is competitive, highly politicized, and often vigorously
disputed. 17 Further complicating this procedure are jurisdictional and sovereignty issues. 8 The Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution specifies that only Congress can supersede Indian sovereignty on Indian
owned lands.' 9 Therefore, to determine whether an Indian tribe can conduct
gaming in a state, the rules promulgated by the federal government must be
examined.2 °

13.
14.
15.

Id.
See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 289.
NAT'L INDIAN GAMING COMM'N, TRIBAL GAMING REVENUES 2007-2008, available

at http://64.38.12.138/docs/nigc/nigc060309.pdf.
16. Kathryn R.L. Rand, Caught in the Middle: How State Politics,State Law, and State
Courts Constrain Tribal Influence Over Indian Gaming, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 971, 973 (2007)
[hereinafter Rand, Tribal Influence].
17. See id. at 972.
18. See Rebecca S. Lindner-Cornelius, Comment, The Secretary of the Interior as
Referee: The States, the Indian Nations, and How Gambling Lead to the Illegality of the
Secretary of the Interior's Regulations in 25 C.F.R. § 291, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 685, 685-86
(2001) ("Federal Indian law is one of the most complex and dynamic areas of law in the United States.").
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20. Lindner-Comelius, supra note 18, at 688 ("The states have a limited role in tribal
relationships. The federal government preempts state power in almost all situations.").
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Indian Gaming Regulatory Act

Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988,
which created a statutory framework for Indian gaming.2' The purpose of
IGRA is stated as "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self
sufficiency, and strong tribal governments. 22 During the late 1980s, the vast23
majority of Native Americans living on reservations faced extreme poverty.
Therefore, gaming was considered a method for allowing the tribes to become less dependent on government funding, and promote economic selfdetermination. 24 Because Congress was attempting to promote economic
independence among the tribes while also preserving the states' role regulating gaming, IGRA is "[w]idely regarded as a political compromise. '' The
result is a complex procedure set forth to grant gaming rights to tribes, which
is limited by the states' right to control certain types of gaming. 26 The states
power to regulate gaming on Indian land is determined by the class of gaming, because each class raises separate jurisdictional issues.27
B.

Indian Gaming Jurisdiction

IGRA separates gaming into three categories.28 Class I gaming includes
social games that are played only for a prize of nominal value. 29 It also includes traditional tribal gambling, including celebrations and ceremonies.3 °
21. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2006).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
23. Kathryn R.L. Rand, There Are No Pequots on the Plains: Assessing the Success of
Indian Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 47, 53 (2002) [hereinafter Rand, Pequots]. Native Americans
"were poor, unemployed, and living in overcrowded and inadequate housing in communities
with minimal government services." Id.
24. See Nicholas S. Goldin, Note, Casting a New Light on Tribal Casinos Gaming: Why
Congress Should Curtail the Scope of High Stakes Indian Gaming, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 798,
812-13 (1999).
25. Rand, Pequots, supra note 23, at 52.
26. See Eric Henderson, Indian Gaming: Social Consequences, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 205,
211 (1997). "The act explicitly views gaming 'as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.' Nevertheless, state interests in
Indian gaming received considerable deference in the drafting of the regulation." Id. (quoting
25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1994)).
27. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a), (d) (2006).
28. Id. § 2703(6)-(8).
29. Id. § 2703(6).
30. Id.; see also Henderson, supra note 26, at 205 ("American Indians, prior to European
contact, participated in a multitude of games and gaming activities. Gambling figured prominently ... and was an important social activity.").
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Class I gaming cannot be controlled by federal or state government because
tribes have the exclusive right to regulate this form of gaming.3, Class H
gaming excludes games that are not banked, electronic, or slot machines.32
Therefore, Class II gaming predominately consists of bingo and card games
that are either, "explicitly authorized by the laws of the State, or are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played at any location in
the State. 33 Tribes maintain the jurisdiction to regulate Class II gaming,
subject to the federal government's approval.34 Finally, Class In gaming is
defined by exclusion as "all forms of gaming that are not [C]lass I gaming or
[C]lass II gaming. '35 Class III, which is the most profitable, consists of
"high stakes, casino-style gambling-slot machines, blackjack, craps, parimutuel wagering and lotteries. ' 36 Before a tribe can conduct Class 1Il gaming, there are several requirements which must be satisfied.37
Although a tribe must satisfy statutory requirements before it can conduct Class mI gaming, the state still does not have jurisdiction to enforce its
38
gaming laws on tribal land absent a compact.
It is true that, under § 1166(a), all state Class HI gambling laws

"apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State." But in the same
breadth, Congress granted 39the United States exclusive jurisdiction
to enforce those state laws.

Although the states do not have jurisdiction to enforce their gaming laws
absent a compact, their laws remain applicable because the act also acknowledges state interests.40 Therefore, before a tribe can conduct Class I gaming, the requirements set forth in IGRA must be satisfied.4 1

31.
32.
33.
34.

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).
Id. § 2703(7)(B).
Id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(1)-(II).
id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).

35.

Id. § 2703(8).

36. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 289.
37. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).
38. See Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 54 F.3d 535, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding the state did not have jurisdiction to prosecute a tribe for conducting gaming on a
reservation).
39. Id. at 541 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2006)).
40. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).
41. See id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)-(B).
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Obtaining Class III Gaming

Because Class III gaming is the most profitable, it is the most disputed
form of gaming, and invokes a delicate balance between the state's power to
regulate, and the tribe's sovereign rights.42 Therefore, IGRA specifies three
requirements for Class I gaming to lawfully be conducted on Indian land.4
First, the gaming must be authorized by the tribe pursuant to an ordinance or
resolution."4 Second, the state the tribe wishes to conduct gaming in must
permit "such gaming for any purpose, by any person organization, or entity."'45 Third, the state and the Indian tribe must enter into a compact which
permits the gaming activity. 46 These complex set of rules were "the result of
a congressional compromise between the demands of state and tribal governments., 47 While each of these requirements present their own issues, the
compact process is particularly complex.48
1.

Prohibited Versus Permitted

A tribe's right to seek Class III gaming is contingent on the activity being "conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and
public policy, prohibit such gaming activity. '49 A state has the power to prohibit Class I gaming on Indian land, but only if the same restriction applies
everywhere in the state without an exception. 50 Therefore, a tribe's right to
pursue Class Iml gaming depends on whether or not the gaming is prohibited
in the state. 5'
When looking to enforce the state gaming laws on tribal land, the federal government will apply the law "in the same manner and to the same extent
as such laws [would] apply elsewhere in the [s]tate. '52 When the federal
government determines what type of gambling is legal in the state, it must
decide whether the state prohibits Class I gaming. 53 While a state can pro42.
43.

See Rand, Pequots, supra note 23, at 52.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).

44. Id. § 2710(d)(l)(A).
45.
46.

Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).

47.

Joe Laxague, Note, Indian Gaming and Tribal-State Negotiations:

Who Should

Decide the Issue of Bad Faith?, 25 J. LEGIS. 77, 80 (1999).
48. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 289-90.
49. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5).
50. See LAC du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State, 770 F.
Supp. 480,484-85 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
51. See Rand, TribalInfluence, supra note 16, at 983.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (2006).
53. N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004).
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hibit certain forms of gaming, it does not have jurisdiction to regulate gaming.54 Therefore, whether a state can prevent a tribe from conducting Class
III gaming turns on whether the state is prohibiting or regulating the particular gaming.55 Currently, federal courts dispute when a state crosses the line
of prohibiting Class I gaming and begins regulating Class EI gaming.56
Courts use two tests to determine whether a state permits Class I gaming as defined by IGRA.57 The first test used to determine whether a state
prohibits or permits a particular type of gaming is the game-specific approach.58 Under this approach a state does not permit a type of gaming unless the "state allows a particular game for any purpose." 59 The second test
used by courts is the categorical approach. 6° The categorical approach holds
that a state must permit all forms of Class III gaming, if any form of Class InI
gaming is permitted in the state. 6' Consequently, whether a state is considered to permit a particular type of gaming depends on the test adopted by
the court of the jurisdiction.62
One way a state can avoid being forced to negotiate a compact is by arguing that the type of gaming the tribe is seeking violates the state's public
policy. 63 For example, in Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indiana v.
Wilson, 64 an Indian tribe filed suit to force the state to negotiate a gaming
compact. 65 At the time of suit, California did not permit "banked or percentage card games" to be conducted.66 The court held that when a state does
not permit the type of gaming that the tribe is requesting, the tribe does not
have a right to engage in the illegal gaming.67 Therefore, the court held that
the state did not have to negotiate with the tribe to grant it a form of gaming

54.
55.
56.

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A).
Id. § 2710(d).
N. Arapaho Tribe, 389 F.3d at 1310-11.

57.

Id.

58. N. Aprapaho Tribe, 389 F.3d at 1311; see Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, 64 F.3d 1250, 1258 (9th Cir. 1994).
59. N. Arapaho Tribe, 389 F.3d at 1311.
60. Id. (citing Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Conn., 913 F.2d 1024, 1031-32 (2d Cir.
1990) (adopting the categorical approach)).
61. Id.
62. See id.

63.

Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 292.

64.

64 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 1994).

65.
66.

Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1256.

67.

Id. at 1258.
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that was otherwise not permitted.68 However, in LAC du Flambeau Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State,69 an Indian tribe brought an action
to force the state to negotiate a gaming compact.7" The court held that because the state permits Class Ell gaming, it must negotiate a compact with the
tribe that would grant the tribe permission to conduct Class m gaming.7 1
The dividing line between these two cases can be drawn at each state's public policy. 72 In Rumsey, the state's public policy towards gaming was prohibitory, thus the state did not have to negotiate a compact for Class I gaming.73 However, in Lac du Flambeau Band, the state's policy against gaming
was regulatory, resulting in the state being forced to negotiate a compact.74
III. GAMING COMPACT
If the type of gaming the tribe seeks to conduct is authorized by the
tribe's governing body, and the state does not prohibit the type of gaming,
next the tribe must enter a compact with the state to obtain Class III gaming. 75 IGRA provides that a tribe cannot operate Class III gaming unless
specifically permitted by a tribal-state compact signed by the tribe and the
state where the Class Il gaming is being conducted. 76 A compact is a covenant or agreement between states or governments.77 Under the United States
Constitution, a state cannot enter into a compact with another state or foreign
power. 78 IGRA, however, eliminates this restriction by setting forth the consent of Congress to all gaming compacts to be executed, contingent on federal approval making them effective.79 IGRA's requirements that a tribe
reaches a compact with the state before it can conduct Class III gaming has
important ramifications by making "the tribes' sovereign right to conduct
gaming dependent on state consent., 8' Therefore, the Act prevents a tribe
68. See id. The state did not allow banked card games. Rumsey Indian Rancheria of
Wintun Indians, 64 F.3d at 1256. The state did not have to give the tribe a form of gaming
that others could not have. Id. at 1258.
69. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
70. Id. at481.
71. Id. at 488.
72. See id.
73. See Rumsey Indian Rancheriaof Wintun Indians, 64 F.3d at 1259.
74. See LAC du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 770 F. Supp. at
488.
75. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2006).
76. See id.
77. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 298 (8th ed. 2004).
78.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.

79.
80.

See 25 U.S.C. § 27 10(d).
Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 288.
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from conducting profitable Class I gaming, without first obtaining a compact signed by the state. 8'
A.

Compact Process

The importance of the tribal-state compact to Indian gaming is clear.
"The essential feature of the Act is the tribal-state compact process, the
means Congress devised to balance the states' interest in regulating high
stakes gambling within their borders and the Indians' resistance to state intrusions on their sovereignty. '82 The process a tribe must follow to negotiate
a compact under IGRA can be summarized as follows. First, the tribe must
request that the state negotiate a compact that would permit Class InI gaming.83 Once a request to negotiate is made by the tribe, IGRA requires that
the state "negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a
compact." ' If an agreement is not reached within 180 days of the tribes request to negotiate a compact, the tribe is permitted to sue the state in federal
court by alleging the state did not negotiate in good faith.85 If the federal
court finds that the state did not act in good faith, the state will be ordered to
reach a compact with the tribe within sixty days.86 Upon the expiration of
the sixty-day negotiation period, if a compact has not been reached, the court
will appoint a mediator.87 Both the tribe and the state are required to submit
proposed compacts to the mediator.88 Next, the mediator will select one of
the proposed compacts. 89 Once a proposal is selected by the mediator, the
proposal is presented to each party and the state must consent to the proposed
compact within sixty days. 90 Once the compact is submitted to the Department of the Interior, the compact will be approved or disapproved within
81. Id. at 288-89.
82. LAC du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. State, 770 F. Supp.
480, 481 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
83. Laxague, supra note 47, at 80. The tribal-state "process begins when the Indian tribe
requests that the state enter into negotiations for creating a tribal-state compact that will govern the Class II gaming operations planned by the tribe." Id.
84. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
85. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B); Laxague, supra note 47, at 80 (explaining that bad faith can be
based on criminality, financial integrity, public safety, and "economic impact on existing
gaming" facilities).
86. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
87. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
88. Id.
89. Id. When selecting one of the proposed compacts the mediator will choose "the
one which best comports with the terms of [IGRA] and any other applicable Federal law and
with the findings and order of the court." Id.
90. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(v)-(vii).
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forty-five days.9' The remainder of part III evaluates the most common issues which arise during the compact process.
I.

Indian Land Requirement

Whether a tribe is able to pursue the compact process is dependent on
the status of the tribe's land.92 IGRA defines Indian land as land located
within an Indian reservation, land that is held in trust by the United States, or
held in trust by someone else who is restricted by the United States.93 Furthermore, for a tribe to have the right to conduct gaming on its land, the land
must have become Indian land before October 17, 1988. 94 Without the requisite land, a tribe cannot utilize IGRA to obtain gaming rights and would have
to argue that it qualifies for an exception.95 If the tribe does not qualify under
an exception, the last method of obtaining the requisite land is through the
federal government, "if the Secretary of the Interior determines

. . .

it would

be in the best interest of the tribe, would not be detrimental to surrounding
communities, and that state and local officials [would] agree. ' 96 With states
reluctant to approve gaming being conducted off of an Indian reservation, a
tribe faces a difficult task if the land was not recognized before 1988. 97 Additionally, "it is clear that the [s]tate does not have an obligation to negotiate
with an Indian tribe until the tribe has Indian lands. 98 Therefore, without
land satisfying the requirements of IGRA, the tribe cannot pursue the compact process to obtain gaming rights. 99
Further restricting a tribe's ability to seek gaming rights is the Court's
recent decision in Carcieri v. Salazar.1°° In this case, the Department of the
Interior accepted land in trust to be used by an Indian tribe.' ° ' The Governor
of Rhode Island brought suit to have the Department of the Interior's decision to take the land in trust reviewed. 02 The Court addressed 25 U.S.C. §
91. See id. § 2710(d)(8)(C). If no action is taken, "the compact shall be considered to
have been approved by the Secretary." Id.
92. Alan E. Brown, Note, Ace in the Hole: Land's Key Role in Indian Gaming, 39
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 159, 161 (2005).
93. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) (2006).
94. Id.
95. See id. § 2719(a)-(b).
96. Brown, supra note 92, at 168.
97. Id. at 166-68.
98. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Engler, 304 F.3d 616,
618 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A)).
99. See id.
100. 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
101. Id. at 1060.
102. Id.
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465, which allows the Secretary of the Department of the Interior (Secretary)
to accept land in "trust only for 'the purpose of providing land for Indians. ' , 0 3 The Court held "that the term 'now under Federal jurisdiction' in
§ 479 unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States when the IRA was enacted in 1934."' 1 4 Although the ramifications of the recent decision remain unclear, it appears that
the decision will limit the power of the Secretary.' 0 5 Further, less tribes will
have the opportunity to acquire the land necessary to obtain gaming rights as
the Secretary lacks "authority to acquire land for a tribe recognized and coming under federal jurisdiction after 1934.' ' °6

2.

Negotiation

Once a tribe shows they have land eligible to conduct Class Ell gaming
on, the tribe must negotiate with the state to reach a compact.10 7 Once the
tribe requests that the state negotiate a compact, IGRA specifies that "the
[s]tate shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter" such a
compact.'0 8 If the tribe believes that the state did not conduct negotiations in
good faith, IGRA grants the tribe the power to sue the state in federal
court."°9 To determine whether the state negotiated in good faith, the court
will evaluate "the public interest, public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse economic impacts on existing gaming activities." 10 If the
Court concludes that the state acted in good faith, the compact process
ends."' However, if the court finds that the state "failed to negotiate in good
faith," the compact process continues." 2 This provision of IGRA was severely limited by the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida (Seminole Tribe I1).113 Seminole Tribe If held when a state asserts the
Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity, the state cannot be sued by the

103.
104.

Id. at 1064 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465).
Id. at 1068.

105. G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, The Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri "Fix": Updating the Trust Land Acquisition
Process,45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 593-94 (2009).
106. Id.

107.

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2006).

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).
ld. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(1).
See id. § 271 0(d)(7)(B)(iii).
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
517 U.S. 44,44 (1996).
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tribe in federal court.' 14 The Court's ruling limited the power a tribe has to
engage in Class III gaming.' 5 Therefore, Seminole Tribe II left the negotiation process procedure unclear.' 16 "One possibility is that there is a right but
no remedy: a tribe can seek a compact, but cannot sue the state if it refuses
' 17
to negotiate.""
a.

Authority to Negotiate

Although IGRA sets forth the requirements a state must follow to enter
a compact with an Indian tribe, and even requires that the state negotiate in
good faith, IGRA does not specify the role of state legislatures.' 1 8 In the
absence of guidelines, the governors of most states have exercised the authority to negotiate tribal-state compacts with Indian tribes." 9 Therefore, due
to the lack of federal guidelines, the authority to negotiate is determined by
state law. 2 °
Some courts have held that the state's governor has the authority to negotiate a gaming compact.' 2 ' Dewberry v. Kulongoski122 is an example of a
23
state that grants the governor authority to negotiate a compact with a tribe.
In Dewberry, opponents of gambling challenged the validity of a compact
that was signed by the Governor. 124 The plaintiff claimed that the compact
was invalid because "neither the Oregon Constitution nor Oregon statute
delegate the authority to execute gaming compacts with Indian tribes, and
thus the [g]overnor is without the power to do so without legislative approval.' 25 The court disagreed, however, and held that the Oregon Constitution
126
granted the Governor the authority to negotiate a gaming compact.
114. Id.at72.
115. Steven A. Light, Kathryn R.L. Rand, & Alan P. Meister, Spreading the Wealth:
Indian Gaming and Revenue-Sharing Agreements, 80 N.D. L. REV. 657, 665 (2004). "In the
wake of the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, a state effectively could prevent a tribe from
engaging in Class III gaming simply by refusing to negotiate a tribal-state compact." Id.
116. See id.
117. ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., GAMING LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 493 n.3 (2003).
118. Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 981.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 982.
121. See Dairyland Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Doyle, 719 N.W.2d 408, 443-44 (Wis. 2006)
(Compact entered into by the governor was valid even though it increased the amount of gambling allowed in the state.).
122. 406 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Or. 2005).
123. Id. at 1157.
124. Id. at 1138.
125. Id. at 1154.
126. Id.
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In contrast, the majority of state courts have held that, although the governor has the authority to negotiate a compact, the governor lacks the authority to bind the state to the compact without legislative approval. 27 While
the holdings are not identical, challenges to the governor's authority have a
common theme--questions regarding the state's constitution. 128 In line with
these state court decisions, federal courts have also held that the governor
lacks the power to bind the state to a gaming compact. 129 For example, in
Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 30 the court held that the governor entering into
31
a compact solely by himself was not enough to make the compact valid.,
Further, because "the [g]overnor lacked the authority to bind the state...
[t]he compact[] [provisions] were therefore never validly 'entered into' by
the state and, as a result, do not comply with IGRA."'' 3 2 While all of these
cases do not have the same outcome, they share in common the procedure of
turning33to the state's constitution to determine if the governor's action were
1
valid.

It should also be noted that if a member of a tribe had an issue with a
compact that was entered into between the state and their tribe, he or she
would likely have no recourse. 1 4 In Langley v. Edwards,135 the court held
that a tribe member could not challenge the validity of a compact entered
into by a tribe and state. 36 The court explained that the tribe members' "dissatisfaction is with the Tribe's decision to permit gaming on tribal lands and
should be properly resolved within the tribal governmental and court structure." 37 Similarly, in Willis v. Fordice,138 an Indian tribe member brought an
action to have a tribal-state compact declared void. 139 The court ruled that

127.

See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 609 (Fla. 2008) (discuss-

ing states that have followed the majority rule that a governor lacks the "authority to bind a
state to an IGRA compact .... ).
128. See Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 982-83.
129. See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1559 (1 0th Cir. 1997).
130. Id. at 1546.
131. Id. at 1559.
132. Id.
133. See Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 982-83.
134.

See Langley v. Edwards, 872 F. Supp. 1531, 1536 (W.D. La. 1995).

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1531.
Id. at 1536.
Id.
850 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
Id. at 524-25.
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the tribe member did not have standing to bring the action and held that the
compact was valid under both state and federal law. 4 °
3.

Approval by the Department of the Interior

If the state and the Indian tribe enter into a compact, it then must be approved by the Secretary of the Department of the Interior. 4' Therefore, even
if the state and the tribe negotiate a compact, it will not take effect until approved by the Secretary who "is authorized to approve any Tribal-State compact entered into between an Indian tribe and a State government gaming on
Indian lands of such Indian tribe."' 4 2 When reviewing the compact, the Secretary can disapprove it if the compact violates "the trust obligations of the
United States to Indians.' 14' This authority to disapprove the compact has
been used to place restrictions on the compact that the Secretary is willing to
approve.144
a.

Exclusivity Requirement

The Department of the Interior has used its statutory authority to require
that a gaming compact grant the tribe exclusive gaming rights. 145 Citing the
federal governments trust responsibility, the Department stresses it will only
approve "compacts that provide substantial exclusivity for Indian gaming in
the state."' 146 Because of this substantial exclusivity requirement, a compact
is much more likely to be approved if the tribe is permitted to conduct gaming that is prohibited everywhere else in the state. 147 Therefore, the exclusivity requirement can be summarized as:
[T]he Tribes enjoy the exclusive "right to operate" so long as the
Tribes are the only persons or entities who have and can exercise
the "right to operate" electronic games of chance in the State or, in
140. Id. at 528-29, 534 (The compact was valid because Mississippi allowed legalized
gambling as a matter of public policy, the governor held the power to negotiate with the tribe,
and the compact was approved by the Secretary.).
141. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B)(2006).
142. Id. § 2710 (d)(8)(A); see also id. §2710 (d)(3)(B).
143. ld. § 2710 (d)(8)(B)(iii).
144. See Eric S. Lent, Note, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State
Revenue Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEo. L.J. 451, 469 (2003).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Katie Eidson, Note, Will States Continue to Provide Exclusivity in Tribal Gaming
Compacts or Will Tribes Bust on the Hand of the State in Order to Expand Indian Gaming,
29 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 319, 328 (2005).
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other words, as long as all others148
are prohibited or shut out from
the "right to operate" such games.

An example of the exclusivity requirement is present in Artichoke Joe's
California Grand Casino v. Norton,149 where a card club brought an action
on equal protection grounds challenging the validity of tribal-state compacts,
which were approved by IGRA. 5 ° The plaintiffs were prohibited from engaging in casino-style gaming, but the compacts provided the Indian tribes
with the exclusive right to engage in Class I1gaming.' 5 ' Despite the Indians
being granted the exclusive right to conduct Class III gaming in the state, the
court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the compact constituted a monopoly. 15 2 Therefore, the court held that the tribal-state compact was valid under IGRA,
and the compact did not violate the Plaintiff's right of equal pro53
tection. 1
b.

Powerto Unilaterally Grant Gaming

In response to Seminole Tribe H, the Secretary proposed and had approved rules that would permit the creation of Class III gaming without the
state entering a compact with the tribe. 154 As a result of the rules, a tribe can
15
now obtain gaming rights in a state that does not approve of a compact. 1
"In sum, these regulations allow the Secretary to approve a gaming compact
after a suit is brought under IGRA and the state has asserted its Eleventh
Amendment right against suit in federal court."' 15 6 Although the Secretary

has been granted
such power, it remains unclear whether or not granting this
157
power is valid.
There have only been a few judicial opinions which address the issue of
whether the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to grant the tribe Class
148. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 93 F. Supp. 2d 850, 852 (W.D.
Mich. 2000) (citation omitted).
149. 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 815 (2004).
150. Id. at 714. The plaintiffs challenged the compact which was entered into "[p]ursuant
to an amendment to the California Constitution that permits casino-style gaming only on
Indian lands." Id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 739 ("[Wie are unpersuaded by Plaintiffs' argument that allowing California to grant to tribes a monopoly on [C]lass IIIgaming operations, restricted to Indian
lands, necessarily will lead to Indian monopolies on other forms of economic activity.").
153. Artichoke Joe's Cal. Grand Casino, 353 F.3d at 742.
154. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703-10 (2006).
155. Lindner-Cornelius, supra note 18, at 693.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 686.
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III gaming without a tribal-state compact.' 58 Possible support of the Secretary's power can be found in Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida (Seminole
/),,59 where the Eleventh Circuit stated the Secretary, after the state asserts
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the case is dismissed, and the Secretary is
notified of the failed negotiation, "then may prescribe regulations governing
[C]lass I gaming on the tribe's lands."'"
In Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington,1 6' the Secretary's power
was explicitly rejected when the court stated, "[t]he Eleventh Circuit's solution would turn the Secretary of the Interior into a federal czar, contrary to
the congressional aim of state participation."'' 62 The court supported its
statement by arguing that under IGRA, the Secretary of the Interior should
only be consulted after a mediator is appointed by the court to direct negotiations between the state and the tribe.163 Even after the negotiations occur, the
Ninth Circuit explained, "the Secretary of the Interior under the statute is 16
to
' 64 Similarly, in Texas v. United States, 5
act only as a matter of last resort."
the court held that the Secretary did not have the authority to proscribe Class
HII gaming when the state does not consent to being sued."6 Although it remains unclear whether the Secretary's power to grant gaming rights to the
tribe without the state's consent is valid, the severity of the threat itself is
enough for it to be taken seriously by a state. 67
IV. FLORIDA GAMING HISTORY

Originally the State of Florida was exceedingly opposed to any form of
gambling.

68

However, over time this immense opposition was gradually

158. Laxague, supra note 47, at 83.
159. l1F.3d 1016 (1lth Cir. 1994), affd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
160. Seminole Tribe!, 11 F.3d at 1029 (dictum). See Seminole Tribe H, 517 U.S. 44, 76
n. 18 (1996) (The court did not address the issue of whether the Secretary had the power to
proscribe Class III gaming without a compact.).
161. 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1994).
162. Id. at 997.
163.

Id.

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 512.
See Neil Scott Cohen, Note, In What Often Appears to Be a Crapshoot Legislative

Process, Congress Throws Snake Eyes When It Enacts the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29

HOFSTRA L. REV. 277, 301 (2001).
168. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 7. "Lotteries, other than the types of pari-mutuel pools
authorized by law as of the effective date of this constitution, are hereby prohibited in this
state." Id.
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reduced as more forms of gaming became permitted in the state. 69 In the
1930s Florida permitted legal betting which included betting on jai alai,
horse races, and dog races. 70 "Beginning in 1978, Florida voters thrice rejected constitutional amendments that would have forced the state to allow
casino gambling. But Florida's political leaders have allowed legal gambling
to gradually increase throughout the state anyway."' 7' The first cruise ship
offering day cruises for gamblers set sail in the early 1980s, and in 1986
Florida voters approved the creation of a state-run lottery. 72 In addition, in
2004, a voter's petition amended the Florida Constitution
to allow Class Ill
173
Counties.
Miami-Dade
and
Broward
both
in
slots
A.

Seminole Gaming

The first controversy surrounding Seminole gaming in Florida began in
1979 when the Tribe opened a bingo hall facility on the Seminole Reserva175
tion in Broward County. 74 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth,
the Seminole Tribe requested that the court "enjoin permanently the Sheriff
176
of Broward County from enforcing Florida's bingo statute on Indian land.'
The court ruled in favor of the Tribe, holding that because of the Tribe's sovereignty, its bingo hall could not be regulated by the state. 77 Shortly after
the Seminole Tribe's favorable ruling in Butterworth, Congress enacted
IGRA, which afforded tribes the right to negotiate a compact with the
state. 178 Despite the adoption of the IGRA, the Seminole Tribe has not been
179
successful in negotiating a compact with the State of Florida.

169. See Charlie Patton, State Eyes Gambling on Casinos the House and Senate Are Trying to Bulk up State Coffers with Indian Revenue, FLA. TIMES UNION, Apr. 28, 2008, at Al.
170. Id.
171. Id.

172.

Id.

173.

FLA. CONST. art. X, § 23.

174. See Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 287. "In 1979, the Seminole Tribe of Florida opened
the first reservation-based bingo parlor." Id.
175.

491 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Fla. 1980), aff'd, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981).

176. Id. at 1016. The statute provided that bingo could not be conducted more than twice
a week and limited the amount of money that could be won. Id. at 1016 n.l.
177.

Id. at 1020.

178.
179.

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2006).
See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
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First Compact

The negotiation of a gaming compact often becomes a political affair,
and the State of Florida is no exception to this trend. 8 ° After the Seminole
Tribe's unsuccessful attempt to compel the State of Florida to negotiate a
compact, the Tribe continued to petition the Department of the Interior (Department). 1 ' After several failed attempts, the Tribe convinced the Department to take affirmative action in 2006, when the Department proclaimed
that if the State of Florida did not sign a compact with the Seminole Tribe
within sixty days, the Department would grant the Seminole Tribe Class MI
gaming. 82 However, the Seminole Tribe sued the Department after sixty
days had passed, because a compact was not reached and the Department
failed to initiate procedures allowing the Seminole Tribe to conduct Class I
gaming. 83 This suit prompted the Department to once again send a demand
184
to the State of Florida, and Governor Crist was advised to enter a compact.
November 15, 2007, was set as a deadline for the compact to be entered into
with the threat that if a compact was not reached, Class III gaming would be
granted to the Seminole Tribe unilaterally,
and the state would miss its op185
portunity to share in the profits.
Seemingly compelled by the Department's threat, Governor Crist entered into a compact with the Tribe. 8 6 To support his decision, "Crist argued
the deal was needed to ensure that Florida got a share of Indian gambling
revenues."'' 87 However, five days after Governor Crist signed the compact,
the Florida House of Representatives filed a petition that challenged the validity of the compact. 8 8 The petition challenged the "Governor's authority to
bind the [s]tate to the [C]ompact without legislative authorization or ratification."' 89 Despite the immediate challenge to the compact, it went into effect
on January 7, 2008, after it was approved by the Secretary.' 9°
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See Rand, Pequots, supra note 23, at 52.
Crist, 999 So. 2d at 605.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Dara Kam, Fight Brewing over Feds' Vow to Expand Seminole Gambling, PALM
BEACH POST, Nov. 9, 2007, at A5. "Interior Department Assistant Secretary Carl Artman
has warned Crist that federal officials will establish Class 3 procedures for the Seminoles if a
compact is not signed by Nov. 15." Id.
186. See Crist, 999 So. 2d at 605-06.
187. Patton, supra note 169.
188. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 606.
189. Id.
190. Id.
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The compact allowed Class I gaming to be conducted at seven casinos
in the State of Florida within the following counties: Okeechobee, Coconut
Creek, Clewiston, Immokalee, Tampa, and two in Hollywood. 91 The Class
III gaming that the Tribe was authorized to offer included: slot machines,
banked card games, high-stake poker games, and any other gaming authorized in the State of Florida. 192 Because the compact allowed the Seminole
Tribe to conduct some Class III gaming, such as banked card games which
are prohibited under state law, the Tribe was given an exclusive gaming
right. 93 The Seminole Tribe was not the only party that benefited from the
compact though; the State of Florida was set to receive fifty million dollars
once the compact became effective. 94 In addition to that sum, during the
first twenty-four months of the compact's operation, the State of Florida
would receive an additional $175 million, $150 million for the third twelve
months95 of operation, and $100 million for each additional twelve-month
cycle.

1

2.

Failure of First Compact

The Florida House of Representatives challenged the validity of the
compact by arguing that the Governor acted outside the scope of his authority.196 The House argued that the Legislature was granted all law-making
power under the Florida Constitution. 97 Like cases in other jurisdictions,
which addressed a claim that the governor did not have authority to negotiate
a compact, the Court looked to the constitution. 198 While turning to the Florida Constitution, the court evaluated whether the Governor's actions violated
the separation of powers doctrine. 99 Article 1H, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o person belonging to one branch shall exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein. ''200 In Florida, the separation of powers doctrine has been

191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 606.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 613.
197. See Steve Huettel, Gambling Interests: Where to Draw the Line on Gaming, Money,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at Pl. Rubio sued Crist "charging the governor overstepped his authority signing the Seminole compact without legislative approval." Id.
198. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 610.
199. Id. at 610-11.
200. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
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strictly construed, thereby favoring a finding of one branch of government
usurping another branch's powers.2"'
The House argued that the power to enter into a compact belongs to the
legislative branch because of residual power.2 2 The basis for the House's
argument is represented by a Supreme Court of Florida decision where the
Court held, "[t]he legislative branch looks to the [c]onstitution not for
sources of power but for limitations upon power., 2 3 Consequently, its argument was that the legislature should receive a power when it is unclear
which branch of government it belongs to.2°4 By contrast, the Governor's
argument was based on article IW, section 1 of the Florida Constitution.2 5
Article IV, section 1 of the Florida Constitution grants the Governor the
power to "transact all necessary business with the officers of government. ",206
Using this language, the Governor argued that he held the power to enter
negotiations with the Indian Tribe, and thereby enter into a compact.2 7
After reviewing both the House's and the Governor's arguments, the
Supreme Court of Florida determined that the Governor's actions violated
the separation of powers doctrine.20 8 The Court found that the Governor
exceeded his power by permitting Class III gaming, an act that was illegal in
the state. 209 "The Governor does not have authority to agree to legalize in
some parts of the state, or for some persons, conduct that is otherwise illegal
throughout the state., 210° The House relied on IGRA's requirement that for a
tribe to enter into a compact, the gaming must be "conducted within a State
which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such
gaming activity." 2 1 The Court cited cases which followed the categorical
approach, and determined that allowing some forms of Class Il gaming does
not mean that all forms are permitted.2 12 The Court stated that both the Secretary's and federal courts' interpretations support the House's argument,
which followed the categorical approach to determine whether a particular

201.
202.

See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. 2004).
See Michael C. Bender, Rubio Seeks Halt to Crist-Seminoles Deal, PALM BEACH
POST, Nov. 20, 2007, at A4.
203. See State ex rel. Green v. Pearson, 14 So. 2d 565, 567 (Fla. 1943).
204. See id.
205. Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 612 (Fla. 2008).
206. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
207. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 612.
208. Id. at 613.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 25 U.S.C § 2701(5) (2006); see Crist,999 So. 2d at 614-15.
212. Crist, 999 So. 2d at 615.
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form of gaming is prohibited by law.213 Therefore, because the compact authorized a prohibited form of gaming, the Court held that the compact was a
violation of Florida law.2 14

The Supreme Court of Florida's decision represents the complex history
of Seminole gaming in Florida, as the negotiations that have been taking
place in some form or another since 1991 were again put to a halt.2 15 However, despite the Supreme Court of Florida's holding, not much has changed
for the Seminole Tribe as it continues to conduct business as though the
compact is valid. 16
B.

Senate Bill 788

The Supreme Court of Florida ruled the first compact entered into between Governor Crist and the Seminole Tribe invalid on July 3, 2008.217 By
the next legislative session, in 2009, the framework for a new compact was
drafted by both the Florida House of Representatives and the Florida Senate. 18 The House bill was drafted to make minor changes, and would require the Seminoles to stop offering games such as blackjack, but allow them
to continue to offer Las Vegas-style slot machines.219 Contrary to the House
bill, the Senate bill significantly increases the amount of gaming, by granting
the Seminole Tribe extensive Class I gaming including roulette, craps, slot
machines, blackjack, and other banked card games, in return for at least four
hundred million dollars annually through extensive revenue-sharing provisions. 221 In an effort likely to increase support from both parties, as well as

213.

Id.

214. Id.
215. See Linda Kleindienst, State High Court Asked to Decide on Compact Legislators
Challenge Crist'sAgreement with Seminoles, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 2008, at B3.

216. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Seminole Indian Compact Review, HB 7129 (2009) Staff
Analysis 6 (Apr. 10, 2009) (on file with comm.), available at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/
Sections/Documents/loaddoc.aspx?FileName=pcb0 I.SICR.doc&DocumentType=Analysis&
Committeeld=2527&Session=2009 [hereinafter HB 7129 Staff Analysis].
The Seminole Tribe was able to begin offering Class IlI slots and banked card games at several
of its locations in Florida ....
The Tribe has been making revenue sharing payments to the
state consistent with their position the now-voided Compact is still valid. To date, the Tribe
has paid $100 million to the State. The Legislature has not appropriated those funds.

Id. at 5-6.
217. Id. at I.
218. See id.; Fla. S. Comm. on Regulated Indus., SB 788 (2009) Staff Analysis I (Apr. 9,
2009) (on file with comm.), available at http:llwww.flsenate.govldatalsessionl2009/Senatel
bills/analysis/pdf/2009s0788.wpsc.pdf [hereinafter SB 788 Staff Analysis].
219. See HB 7129 Staff Analysis, supra note 216, at ].
220. SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 218, at 1-2.
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the public at large, the bill mandates that all revenue payments given to the
state must be deposited in the Educational Enhancement Trust Fund.22 1
Florida's gradual approval of gambling came full circle when law makers approved Senate Bill 788 on May 8, 2009.222 One fan of the bill was
Governor Crist, who "thanked lawmakers for their vigilance in finding common ground. 223 Another initial fan was the Seminole Tribe who stated, the
Florida Legislature took a crucial step towards ending the nineteen years of
waiting for Las Vegas-style gambling. 224 In line with the history of the relationship between the Seminole Tribe of Florida and lawmakers, the initial
positive outlook for Senate Bill 788 quickly turned to similar talks of litigation that existed during the previous compact attempt. 225 Faced with a deadline of August 31, 2009 to sign the compact with the Seminoles, the question
remains whether Senate Bill 788 should satisfy the procedures set forth by
the compact process. 226
1. Applying the Compact Requirements to Senate Bill 788
Unlike the federal government, "Florida has no statutory framework for
establishing gaming compacts with Indian tribes." 227 Therefore, determining
whether Senate Bill 788 should satisfy the compact process requires applying
IGRA and the relevant case law discussed thus far. Furthermore, by comparing the failed compact of 2008 with Senate Bill 788, the chance of success
for the new bill can be forecasted.
a.

Indian Land Requirement

Before a tribe can benefit from the rights set forth in IGRA, and ultimately engage in compact negotiations with the state, the tribe must have the
requisite land.228 Generally, the tribe must have acquired the land before
1988, the year IGRA was enacted, to become eligible to begin the Class III
229
gaming
negotiation
process.
However,
a recent
United
Supreme
Court decision
appears
to have changed
this,
increasing
the States
difficulty
in sa221. See id. at 2.
222. Klas, supra note 1. "The Senate voted, 31-9, for the bill (SB 788). In the more antigambling House, the vote was 82-35." Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
226. See id.
227. HB 7129 Staff Analysis, supra note 216, at 1.
228. See Brown, supra note 92, at 161.
229. See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) (2006).
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tisfying the land requirement, by holding that a tribe must have had the land
in its possession in 1934 in order to be eligible to conduct Class EI1 gaming.23 Fortunately, the Seminole Tribe "is a federally recognized Indian
tribe whose reservations and trust lands are located in the State" of Florida. 23 ' Therefore, the Seminole Tribe appears to be unaffected by Carcieri,
and will likely be able to continue the negotiation process with the State of
Florida to acquire Class III gaming rights.2 32
b.

Negotiation Process

IGRA does not specify who may represent the state when negotiating a
compact with a tribe. 33 Therefore, "[w]ithout prescribed authority in IGRA,
the state legislature's role in the compacting process is left to state law,
which may require legislative approval before a tribal-state compact takes
effect, or may relegate the legislature to political criticism or support of the
governor's compact negotiations. ,,234meCutoFlrdmaei
The Supreme Court of Florida made it
clear that the Governor does not have the authority to execute a compact that
authorizes gambling that is illegal.235
Senate Bill 788 allows the Seminole Tribe to conduct types of Class I
gaming, which is otherwise illegal in the state.236 Furthermore, Florida follows the game-specific approach, which "requires courts to review whether
state law permits the specific game at issue.''237 Under the game-specific
approach, the fact that certain types of Class II games are permitted in the
state, such as in Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, is not determinative.2 38
Further, this approach holds that because the compact grants some form of
Class I gaming that is illegal in the state, the bill authorizes illegal Class HI
gaming.239 This means that under the holding of Crist, the Governor cannot
execute Senate Bill 788 without "the Legislature's prior authorization or, at
least, its subsequent ratification.'
230.
(2009).
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
d'Alene
238.
239.
240.

See Rice, supra note 105, at 593-94; Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1068
Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla. 2008).
See id.
See Rand, Tribal Influence, supra note 16, at 981.
Id. at 982.
Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 217, at 1.
N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308, 1311 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Coeur
Tribe v. Idaho, 842 F. Supp. 1268, 1278 (D. Idaho 1994)).
See id.
See id.
Crist, 999 So. 2d at 616.
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Fortunately for the success of Senate Bill 788, it implements the holding
in Crist.24 ' Anticipating the same problem faced by the previous compact
the Legislature drafted a bill which:
authorizes the [glovernor to execute an agreement on behalf of the
state with the Indian tribes for the purpose of negotiating agreements to develop and implement a fair and workable arrangement
regarding the application of state taxes on persons and transactions
on Indian Lands. It requires that such
an agreement must be ap242
proved or ratified by the Legislature.
If followed, this provision of Senate Bill 788 will avoid the issues that
were fatal to the previous compact.24 3 This is because requiring Governor
Crist to have the bill ratified, if any changes are made, avoids violating the
separation of powers. 244 Although Senate Bill 788 was drafted to avoid the
compact from being held invalid due to lack of authority, the authority of
Governor Crist to negotiate "expires at the end of the day on August 31,
2009. ",245 Therefore, if one issue arises in the compact process, it could be
detrimental to Senate Bill 788.246
c.

Approval by the Departmentof the Interior

Before a tribal-state compact granting Class III rights becomes effective, it must be approved by the Department of the Interior. 247 The Department of the Interior has made clear its decision to only approve of compacts
that grant the Indian tribes substantially exclusive gaming rights.248 Rights
are deemed substantially exclusive when the tribe receives "the exclusive
249
authorization to operate Class MI gaming within the state's territory.,
Therefore, before Senate Bill 788 can become effective, the Department of
the Interior must approve the compact. 250 Additionally, the bill will not be
241.

See SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 217, at 2.

242. Id.
243. See Crist, 999 So. 2d at 616.
244. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. "The powers of the state government shall be divided
into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall
exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided
herein." Id.
245. SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 218, at 11.
246. See id.
247. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) (2006).
248. See Lent, supra note 144, at 469.
249. Eidson, supra note 147, at 328.
250. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
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approved unless the Seminole Tribe is given substantially exclusive gaming
rights in the State of Florida.25'
Senate Bill 788 "provides the Tribe with partial but substantial exclusivity consistent with the goals of IGRA. Payments to the state will cease if any
Class I1 gaming is authorized in any area of the state, except Miami-Dade
and Broward Counties, that is not presently authorized. 252 This language
makes it apparent that the Florida Legislature contemplated the substantial
exclusivity requirement of IGRA.253 However, when the standard is applied
to the gaming granted to the Seminole Tribe, it seems likely that the Department of the Interior will not consider the requirement to be satisfied.
Under the substantial exclusivity requirement, the State of Florida must
grant the Seminole Tribe the exclusive right to conduct a type of Class HI
gaming.254 However, Senate Bill 788 authorizes the tribe to conduct Class
III gaming, which is currently permitted in Miami-Dade and Broward Coun25 Since the Seminole Tribe has a valid argument that it is not given
ties. 255
exclusive gaming rights, this step in the compact process is likely to lead to
difficulties in the negotiation. In fact, the lack of exclusivity in Senate Bill
25
788 has already been an issue in the negotiation process. 256 Barry Richard,
the Seminole Tribe's attorney said, "[t]he legislature's proposal 'significantly
impairs the guarantee of exclusivity' and thus the profits that the tribe could
earn."2 57 Because of the issue with Senate Bill 788 not satisfying the substantial exclusivity requirement, as required by the federal government, there
could be more delay in the negotiation process, which ultimately could result
in a deal not being reached by the August 31, 2009 deadline.258
Whether the Department of Interior can unilaterally grant gaming rights
to a tribe without the state's consent is an issue which has not been resolved
in Florida.25 9 Despite the Department of the Interior successfully having
procedures passed that allow the unilateral granting of gaming rights to a
tribe, the validity of this power remains unclear. 260 However, because of the
great loss a state could suffer, threats from the Department of the Interior
should be taken seriously.2 6 ' Similar to the previous compact, threats have
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See Eidson, supra note 147, at 328; Lent, supra note 144, at 469.
SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 218, at 5.
See id.
See Eidson, supra note 147, at 328.
See SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 218, at 5.
Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
Id.
See id.
See SB 788 Staff Analysis, supra note 217, at 8-9.
See generally Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2007).
See Cohen, supra note 167, at 301.
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been made regarding the completion of Senate Bill 788.262 Once again,
while trying to negotiate the compact, Governor Crist is simultaneously being told by the Department of the Interior that the state's failure to act would
result in the federal government granting the Seminole Tribe gaming
rights.263 Reminiscent of the prior compact, it appears Governor Crist will be
forced to make "a 'battlefield decision' by negotiating the compact, knowing
that if he" does not act, the United States Department of Interior may allow
Class Ell gaming "at the tribal casinos anyway and Florida [will not get] a
dime from the deal."
V.

CONCLUSION

When Senate Bill 788 was first signed in May 8, 2009, it appeared as
though the Seminole Tribe's seventeen years of negotiation attempts would
finally be successful. However, with less than a month before the August 31,
2009 deadline, it seems the State of Florida and the Seminole Tribe will be
unable to satisfy the complex compact process. The Florida Legislature
clearly drafted Senate Bill 788 to account for the failures of the previous
compact as addressed by the Supreme Court of Florida.265 However, the
Florida Legislature overlooked the significance of the substantial exclusivity
requirement imposed by the Department of the Interior. Considering the
potential for a loss of billions of dollars that could benefit the Educational
Enhancement Trust Fund of Florida, both Governor Crist and the Florida
Legislature should plan accordingly. Although this may require offering
more gaming rights to the Seminole Tribe, giving the Department of the Interior the chance to unilaterally issue procedures may be too much of a gamble.

262.
263.
264.
265.

Kam, Gaming Deal, supra note 4.
See id.
Kleindienst, supra note 215.
See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008).
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